Report 20 - Access to Information Review Task Force

THE ACCESS TO INFORMATION ACT AND THE SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN CANADA

III. Access Issues and the Future

The nature of security and intelligence practices and the environment which the S&I community must monitor has changed significantly since the end of the Cold War. The pace of change is increasing and shows no sign of letting up, stimulated by two key phenomenon: changes to the structure of international and domestic affairs brought about by globalisation; and the application of new technology to information in what has amounted to a virtual communications revolution.

Spotting general trends is one thing. Trying to apply them to the question of how they might affect the functioning of the Access system in future is another. A starting point, in my view, is the proposition that the essential bargain underlying the Access system is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. Despite the increasing volume of open source information, the security and intelligence community will continue to possess and need to protect secrets having to do with sources, targets, methods, reporting, and allied relationships in order to be able to function effectively. It will continue to be important that the analytical arm of the community, including the J-2 office at DND, the Research, Analysis and Production (RAP) branch of CSIS, and the Intelligence Assessment Secretariat (IAS) at the Privy Council Office, be able to provide sensitive intelligence assessment to government decision-makers, without fear that such assessments will feature the next day on Page One of the Globe and Mail or the National Post.

I would also be prepared to predict that whatever organizational reforms might affect the security and intelligence community in the future, it is unlikely that the community will ever lose its distinct and separate status. An on-going requirement for intelligence, based on a blend of open and secret information, will continue to be served by a recognisable intelligence community, which will continue to be walled off to a degree from the rest of government operations.

Predictions of a basic continuity of institutions and practises in the security and intelligence area have implications for future Access regimes. The features of the Access Act and information release policies relating to contemporary records discussed above in Section II are unlikely to change, in my view. The S&I community will continue to enjoy strong exempting powers under the Act, and material released to the public through Access will continue to be extremely limited and fragmentary. In return for the continued maintenance of such powers, the Security and Intelligence Community must continue to be proactive about the release of information outside Access channels and must continue their efforts to engage in serious dialogue with experts in academe and the private sector and interested members of the public.

The relationship between future change and historical records needs to be kept in view. Time sensitivity bars set in one period, a reform which I hope will emerge out of the present Task Force Study, will need to be reviewed for their relevance in future. As the pace of change alters, the question of what constitutes a "historic" record must be reconsidered. But there is nothing on the horizon that should in any way alter the determination to provide for the coherent release of historic records and the preservation of a publicly accessible archive of government records.

One prominent new feature of the security and intelligence environment concerns fears of information warfare and hacker and cracker assaults on information systems. It is reasonable to assume that the security and intelligence community will step up their efforts to protect their information through compartmented systems, encryption and other methods. The effect of such defensive measures is difficulty to predict. Their wholesale adoption may lead to increased rigour in the preservation and cataloguing of information, and thus by implication a more secure and well-organised archive for future purposes. Equally, it is possible that the need to protect information from malicious assault will lead to increasingly decentralised systems of retention and storage which will have the effect of fragmenting information holdings to such an extent that it will be impossible to cement them together as a coherent archive when the time comes to make information publicly available through release or transfer to the National Archives.

A challenge that the security and intelligence community currently faces, and which will no doubt increase in magnitude in future, is to identify the important and reliable items of knowledge in an ever-growing torrent of information available through both open and secret sources. The timeliness of intelligence reporting is also an increasingly important issue and challenge. In response, the community will probably be driven to an increasing use of electronic means of information capture and dissemination, to the proliferation of inter-agency networks of shared information and reporting, and to visual sources of information and visual displays and deliveries of data. Changes in the way information is captured and used in the security and intelligence sector may have implications for the future definition of what constitutes a "record" under the definition of the Access Act. They may also complicate issues of record control, identification, and retrieval.

Such challenges raise issues of future information management which fall largely outside the scope of my paper. But it is worth making the simple point that the future of Access and indeed of the archival system is based on successful solutions to information retention in an information saturated age.

Lest we be gripped by runaway visions of the impact of technology on information management, it is useful to remind ourselves of the abiding significance of the human factor. Access will only ever be as good as the people who manage it; changes to the Access system will only be of value if they can be effectively administered by Access staff. On this point, a last word should go to Cuineas Boyle, the Director of the Access division of the PCO and a veteran Access official. In our consultation, reflecting on the nature of Access, she quoted the British poet (and University librarian) Philip Larkin: "a serious house on serious earth it is." Like all houses, Access needs occasional renovations to attune it to present occupants and present tastes. Design flaws need to be fixed. But the Larkin quote also brings a different sort of truth to the surface. To look after a serious house on serious earth, we need serious people.

Ultimately, the future success of the Access system depends on human talent and the exercise of good judgement. As is true for the security and intelligence community itself, the Access system's most precious commodity is talent. As we head further into the twenty-first Century, Access will face increasing challenges in the release of historic records, in the handling of contemporary records, and in future planning. Technology will be a potential handmaiden, but the real solution to meeting such challenges will be the people employed in the system. The question of hiring, training, and retaining qualified Access personnel may already be at a crisis stage. The Access section of the National Archives is currently trying to cope with heavy workloads with only two-thirds of their authorised FTEs. If there is any universal complaint about the Access system as it now operates, it is one of delays upon delays, and the frustrations this engenders.

Given present problems with regard to staffing and talent, the future is bound to be worrisome. The question of whether future Access officers will be able to understand future records and their significance and sensitivity in the security and intelligence field is a real one. Should they not have such a capacity, we will end up with an Access system that, for the purposes of judgements over release, simply apes the classification systems employed by the security and intelligence community. And in so far as intelligence communities the world over have a bad habit of over-classifying their material, this is not an appropriate habit to export to Access decisions.

Perhaps the best and only way to prepare for the challenges of the future of Access is to attempt to fix the problems that exist with regard to historic and contemporary records. This provides the best preparation for riding whatever tiger the future sends our way.

Recommendations regarding Future Challenges and Access

16. In order to anticipate future challenges to the Access regime, there should be a capacity for study and consultation built into the Access system to link appropriate Divisions and their staff.

17. The Access Act will need future reviews of the kind launched by the Treasury Board. Such reviews should, in future, be closely linked to information management policy reviews in order to have maximum value. They should also involve an element of public consultation.

CONSULTATIONS

Badgley, Kerry. Archivist in State, Military and International Affairs records section, National Archives of Canada

Beeby, Dean. Bureau Chief, Canadian Press, Halifax, Nova Scotia.

Bell, Stewart. Journalist, National Post, Toronto.

Boyle, Cuineas. Director, Access to Information and Privacy Division, Privy Council Office.

Bradley, Tom. Assistant Director and head of Canadian Security Intelligence Service Secretariat.

Bronskill, Jim. Journalist, Southam News and the Ottawa Citizen.

Campbell, Anthony. Formerly Executive Director, Intelligence Assessment Secretariat, Privy Council Office, 1992-1999. Currently, President, Campbellintel consulting.

Dickenson, Lawrence, Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet, Security and Intelligence [discussion off the record]

Dozois, Paulette. Senior archivist for External Affairs/ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade records, National Archives of Canada

Farson, Professor Stuart. Department of Political Science, Simon Fraser University; Web Administrator, Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies.

Finner, Madeleine. Executive Director, Communications Security Establishment.

Gawman, Sarah. Acting Director, Access to Information and Privacy Division, National Archives of Canada.

Hewitt, Professor Steve. Visiting Professor, Department of History, Purdue University.

Joubert, Nicole. Access officer, Canadian Security Intelligence Service.

Kealey, Professor Greg. University Research Professor and Dean of Graduate Studies, Memorial University, Newfoundland.

McIntosh, Bob. Chief of State, Military and International Affairs records, National Archives of Canada.

Marsden, Paul. Senior archivist responsible for military records, National Archives of Canada.

Rudner, Professor Martin. President, Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies (CASIS); Professor, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University.

Sallows, Karen. Security and Intelligence Secretariat, Privy Council Office. [Discussion off-the-record]

Sirois, Normand. Access Officer, Canadian Security Intelligence Service.

Whitaker, Professor Reg. University Research Professor, York University.

APPENDIX B

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

CFIOG. Canadian Forces Information Operations Group. Responsible, among other things, for the manning of Canadian SIGINT stations.

CIA. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

Co-ordinator, Security and Intelligence. The senior official in the Canadian security and intelligence community. The Co-ordinator is positioned in the Privy Council Office and reports to the Clerk of the Privy Council. He or she is assisted by the S&I secretariat.

CSE. Communications Security Establishment. Canada's signals intelligence agency. Also has a mandate for government information protection.

CSIS. Canadian Security Intelligence Service. Canada's domestic intelligence agency.

IAS. Intelligence Assessment Secretariat, Privy Council Office

PCO. Privy Council Office

J-2. The intelligence branch of the Department of National Defence

RAP. Research, Analysis and Production branch of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service.

S&I (Security and Intelligence). Often referred to as the S&I "Community," a loose network of agencies and departments with responsibilities in the field of security and intelligence. The main departments and agencies involved are Department of National Defence, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Privy Council Office, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the Communications Security Establishment and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

SIGINT. Signals intelligence. Information collected through the interception and processing of foreign communication

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