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Access
to Information Review Task Force
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Report 28 - Access to Information Review Task Force
THE INFORMATION COMMISSIONER INVESTIGATIVE POWERS AND PROCEDURES
VIII - Conclusion
As I have stated on a number of occasions in this paper, I am of the
view that the investigative regime established for the Commissioner in
his role as an Ombudsman is fundamentally sound but there are changes
which, in my view, would enhance his role and provide for a fairer and
more effective exercise of the oversight role.
Notwithstanding the basic soundness of the regime, it is becoming apparent
that there is a growing problem. The level of distrust and animosity between
the Office of the Access to Information Commissioner and many government
institutions is unacceptable. Why is this? In my view the fault lies both
with the government and with the Commissioner.
No doubt there is some truth to the Commissioner's criticisms of the
government at pages 16 and 17 of his 2000-2001 Annual Report:
The greatest shortcomings in the right of access are not shortcomings
in the words of the Act but in the deeds of those who administer the
Act, Reform must focus on where it is most needed.
The reasons for the past failure provide clues to the pitfalls which
the current review faces. Secrecy in government deeply entrenched -
primarily at all senior levels of the bureaucracy. Secrecy cloaks public
servants in relative anonymity as the handmaiden of the notion of "ministerial
accountability". Secrecy, too, gives governments more control over the
management of information flows to the public. The access law
with a positive right of access by anyone present in Canada to most
records held by government, coupled with a deadline for response
constitutes a frontal attack on both of these perceived virtues of secrecy.
Consequently, there is every incentive for officials to resist, if not
impede, the operation of the law.
While a certain amount of resistance to the release of some information
is to be expected, I suspect that much of the problem is one of resources.
How much money is the government willing, or able, to devote to records
management and access to information issues? The answer to that question
is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is clearly a question, the answer
to which is important in a final determination of how the oversight of
the legislation should be structured.
As well, genuine and principled differences on the interpretation of
the Act will occur between complainants, the Information Commissioner
and government institutions. Often the best way to deal with these differences
effectively and properly is to bring them to Court for determination.
Even Sweden, with over 250 years of experience with its access legislation
and one of the most open administrative cultures of the world, has some
access issues regularly before the courts. However the body charged with
oversight also plays a significant role in making access to information
legislation work. The oversight body can resolve some of these interpretation
issues and, in my view, can best do that as an adjudicative body. In many
cases the most important factor is that there be consistency and certainty.
That should be the objective of the first level of oversight.
In my view the Office of the Information Commissioner has failed to develop
- or at least communicate to the government institutions - a sufficiently
coherent approach to its oversight role and investigative mandate. Conclusions
as to the application of exemptions and the interpretation of exempting
provisions are not routinely published. Investigators are perceived as
not always having a focussed plan for an investigation. Time may be wasted
because there are no published investigative procedures and government
institutions which receive few requests, or which are seldom the subject
of an investigation, have little idea what to expect. Most telling, even
those institutions with a lot of experience with investigations report
being surprised by the way the Commissioner's Office exercises its investigative
powers. The Commissioner's Office does not appear to have completely thought
out its role in investigating allegations of individual misconduct.
Subpoenas and aggressive examinations of senior officials, including
Ministers, have certainly put access on the radar screen of departments
but have also scarred the relationship, perhaps for the long term, and
diminished considerably the potential for compromises, accommodation and
settled solutions. This has led to confusion and uncertainty, a perception
of unfairness and mistrust. To some extent, the Office of the Information
Commissioner may have lost some of its ability to exert that "moral suasion"
to which John Grace referred, and which is so essential for the exercise
of an effective Ombudsman function.
In my view, both the government and the Office of the Information Commissioner
must share in the responsibility for the current state of their relationship.
Both will have to be responsible for repairing the relationship. Hopefully
that can be accomplished through the process of working together to implement
the recommendations of this Task Force.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Barbara McIsaac, Q.C.
Barbara McIsaac is the Managing Partner of the Ottawa office of
McCarthy Tétrault, LLP. She graduated from Queen's Law School
in 1973 and was called to the Ontario Bar in 1975. She was in private
practice in Ottawa from 1974 until 1983 when she joined the Civil
Litigation Section of the Department of Justice. In 1990 she was
appointed Queen's Counsel. She returned to private practice in 1994,
joining McCarthy Tétrault.
Mrs. McIsaac served as Senior Counsel to the Somalia Inquiry. She
has been counsel in such varied cases as Pioneer Hi-Bred
in which the Supreme Court of Canada decided that the Patent
Act does not permit the patenting of life forms; Mossop v.
The Attorney General of Canada in which the Supreme Court of
Canada ruled on the interpretation of the term 'family status' in
the Canadian Human Rights Act; Southam v. The Queen
in which the Ontario Court of Appeal ruled that the provisions of
the Young Offenders Act prohibiting the publication of the
names of victims or offenders did not violate the Charter;
and Haig v. The Queen in which the Court of Appeal ruled
that the Canadian Human Rights Act violates the Charter
by failing to include sexual orientation as a proscribed ground
of discrimination.
In addition to a number of Charter and public law cases,
Mrs. McIsaac has represented private clients and the federal government
in cases involving contract disputes, environmental matters, product
liability and tort claims and professional liability and employment
matters.
Access to Information
and Privacy Issues Experience
While with the Department of Justice, Mrs. McIsaac was the Co-ordinator
of Litigation involving the Privacy and Access to Information
Acts and was counsel in a number of court cases involving the
interpretation and application of those statutes. She also provided
advice to various government departments and agencies regarding
the interpretation of the statutes and participated, with the Access
to Information and Privacy Law section of the Department of Justice,
in the Parliamentary review of the legislation. She was also involved
in co-ordination with the Privacy and Access to Information Commissioners
in respect of matters involving the application of the two statutes.
Since returning to private practice, Mrs. McIsaac has represented
the Government and Government Agencies, Private Parties and the
Privacy Commissioner of Canada in access to information and privacy
matters. She recently appeared before the Supreme Court of Canada
on behalf of the Commissioner of Official Languages in Lavigne v.
The Commissioner of Official Languages in which the Court is examining
the scope of section 22(1)(b) of the Privacy Act [section 16(1)(c)
of the Access to Information Act] and the interface between the
disclosure requirements of the Privacy Act and the confidentiality
requirements of the Pravacy Act and the confidentiality requirements
imposed on the Commissioner of Official Languages when conducting
an investigation; and on behalf of CSIS in Ruby v. the Solicitor
General in which the Court is considering whether the special provisions
for in camera and ex parte hearing in the Privacy Act violate section
2(b) or 7 of the Charter. She is a co-author of The Law of Privacy
in Canada (Carswell, 2000), and is a frequent speaker on access
to information and privacy issues.
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