Report 5 - Access to Information Review Task Force

TRUST WITHIN AND AMONG ORGANIZATIONS AS IT RELATES TO THE ACCESS TO INFORMATION FRAMEWORK

Published: January 2002

Guy M. Corriveau

Table of Contents

1. Background
2. Situating Trust
3. Types of Trust
4. Levels of Trust
5. Dynamics of Trust
6. Erosion of Trust
7. Repairing Trust
8. Building Trust
9. How Values Affect Trust
10. Towards Openness
11. Conclusion
12. References

Background

In the context of the Access to Information Act, trust is central to the concept of "open" government, which according to the 1977 Green Paper preceding the Act, is the basis for democracy. Historically, in the Canadian cabinet-parliamentary system of government, as in all Westminster style systems, there has been a long-standing tradition of guarding information based on the principles of cabinet solidarity, ministerial responsibility, public-service neutrality and anonymity, and adversary-based operations. Although some government documents may have been available on request prior to the adoption of the Access to Information Act in 1982, no statutory protection of the right to access government information then existed.

Notwithstanding the administrative and legislative changes of the past 18 years, designed to extend access to government information, the concepts of "openness," and "right to know," remain, in practice, controversial and not fully achieved. The Information Commissioner, an officer of Parliament, talks in his Annual Reports about a "culture of secrecy," while other critics complain that the process for dealing with Access to Information requests is complicated, cumbersome and less than satisfactory in terms of protecting a right to know. In spite of the Act's stipulation that every Canadian "has a right to and shall, on request, be given access to any record under the control of a government institution" (R.S.C. 1985), Ministers and public servants alike, it would seem, continue to exercise caution in their procedures, habits, and attitudes towards releasing information. A sense that the government is paying lip service to enacted "openness" programs only serves to jeopardize the perception of the government's ability to manage affairs honestly and in the public interest.

Whether or not these criticisms and concerns are justified, the fact that they are publicized in the media contributes to a perception that governments and bureaucracy are unwilling to share information. Along with a wide range of other developments, the perception of a closed and secretive policy and administrative process contributes to declining trust. The packaging of news directly affects the public's trust in individuals or organizations. News stories that emphasize themes of winning and losing and the self-interest implied by that orientation, and that activate negative actor traits such as lying, staging, pandering, and positioning for advance, tend to promote greater mistrust and cynicism than more neutral, issue-oriented stories (Cappella and Jamieson, 1997). The more gaps there are between expectations and the government's, or the bureaucracy's, perceived ability to deliver, the more trust erodes.

Another dimension of trust, that of trust within and between organisations, also has a significant impact on the successful delivery of access to information, Based on previous Annual Reports of the Information Commissioner, and recent submissions and consultations to the Access to Information Review Task Force, the issue of trust within and among the involved organizations represents a serious concern. How well or poorly the Access to Information Act is interpreted and applied in practice both reflects and influences trust among the key stakeholders of the Access to Information community. This community consists of ministers, deputy ministers, Access Co-ordinators, other departmental employees, the Treasury Board Secretariat, the Justice Department, the office of the Information Commissioner, and others. While these stakeholders and institutions have different mandates under the Access to Information Act, trust and collaboration among them would contribute to a more effective application of the Act.

This paper tries to help understand the issues and concerns surrounding trust within the Access to Information system by providing a synopsis of the recent literature on the concept of trust: what it is, what its dynamic is within and among organizations, how it may be eroded, repaired or developed, and how values affect its condition.

Situating Trust

Trust is elusive and difficult to comprehend (Bennis and Nanus, 1985). Indeed, numerous definitions can be found in the literature and across academic disciplines. However, there is general agreement that trust involves faith or a belief in people or organizations - faith that their motivations, capacities, and actions concerning the rights and interest of others will be ethical, fair, and nonthreatening. There is also agreement in available theory and research on the personal qualities that allow people to trust and be trusted. For example, trust requires qualities such as honesty, integrity, altruism and even benevolence. Trustworthiness requires discreteness, reliability, transparency, and predictability. Trust involves interdependence and therefore vulnerability and risk. Trust is fundamental to successful transactions; it engenders learning, growth, co-operation, and collaboration. Finally, trust is dynamic; it can change in nature and fluctuate over time.

Types of Trust

There are different types of trust depending on the environment, the relationship, or the transaction (Rousseau, 1998; Lewicki and Bunker, 1996; Shappiro et al., 1992; Dasgupta, 1988). Deterrence-based trust, for example, links the willingness to trust to the belief that there is a credible threat of punishment for failure to cooperate. In this type of relationship, involvement between parties is limited or superficial and usually compliant. Calculus-based or knowledge-based trust is based on the trustee's reputation and predictability as provided by certification or references. Here, trustors "trust but verify" and the willingness to trust is usually limited to specific exchanges. Relational trust or identification-based trust, on the other hand, occurs when parties take on the needs and desires of others as personal goals and act in ways that consider joint gains. This form derives from repeated interactions over time between a trustor and a trustee. Reliability and dependability in previous interactions give rise to positive expectations about parties' intentions. Managers typically strive to develop this type of trust to optimize risk taking.

Reciprocal trust is found where parties advance each other's interests out of duty, love, or enlightened self-interest. In these relationships, advancement of individual interests is a by-product of devotion to the common good. Representative trust, on the other hand, is the more common form of reliance on others. It involves handing over trust to an organization, merely asking that it be honoured in return. The trustee honours that trust by protecting the trustor's interests.

Conditional trust is a type wherein parties have stable expectations of each other and their interactions are routine, predictable, and reliable. Trustee and trustor are willing to transact with each other, on the condition that each behaves appropriately, uses a similar interpretative scheme to define the situation, and can assume the role of the other. Conditional trust relationships are usually sufficient to facilitate transactions and most commonly exist in the organizational setting. Parties subject to conditional trust arrangements usually define their roles according to expected job behaviours and assigned duties. They typically refrain from seeking help because they do not want others to think they are inadequate, they do not want to be indebted to another person, and/or they do not want to feel threatened by being dependent upon another person (Brehm, 1966; Greenberg, 1980; Nadler, 1991; Walster, et al., 1978). In conditional trust relationships, the achievement of common goals and co-operation involves little personal cost or self-sacrifice; the assurance of shared values that orient the parties to the future is absent; and the positive affect, necessary to infuse and foster relations, is lacking. Conditional trust promotes the sharing of knowledge to accomplish ongoing tasks, but little more (Williamson, 1985).

Unconditional trust, on the other hand, is characterised by a sense of mutual identification, a mutually high confidence level, and a mutual belief in shared values that is backed up by empirical evidence derived from consistent behavioural interactions. The development of the unique capabilities that lead to tacit knowledge is engendered by unconditional trust.

Parties involved in unconditional trust relationships define their roles within and among organizations more broadly. They are more likely to seek help when they need it, and are more likely to cooperate and to do whatever they can for the common good. They share values and expectations, are likely to invest in the relationship, and look more to the future than the present when deciding how to behave. It follows that unconditional trust fosters team building or collegial interaction and is a desirable state towards which important social institutions should strive.

Political trust is defined as a basic evaluative orientation toward government and its institutions, founded on how well the government is operating according to people's normative expectations (Heatherington, 1998; Stokes, 1962; Miller, 1974).

Institutional trust refers to confidence in a system's processes that are intended to deter opportunistic behaviour and promote co-operation. It also refers to legal mechanisms, licensing bodies, social networks, and societal norms in a given organization. Trust within and among most organizations is characterized by a mutual understanding of expectations and responsibilities, and is usually developed over time as a result of consistent behaviour (Public Service Commission, 1995a). By generating common expectations, bureaucracies support institutional trust.

In all cases, and in the context of the Access to Information framework, the interaction of values, attitudes, moods and emotions, the expectations based on historical, empirical, or anecdotal experiences, the nature of the relationship, and the success of the transactions, will all affect whether trust exists and what type is most exhibited in relationships. The reader conversant with the Access to Information framework should be able, more precisely, to identify which types of trust exist between the variety of actors involved in the access processes.

Regardless of type, trust is institutionalized in an organization's hierarchical arrangements, rules, roles, and relations (Fox, 1974). It is embedded in everything an organization does or tries to do. It is explicit and implicit. It is in the climate and the culture. It is found in every interpersonal, inter-organizational, and intra-organizational encounter, at every meeting. It permeates organizations (Carnevale, 1995).

Levels of Trust

Fox (1974) suggests that a successful organization is built on a foundation that includes not only different types of trust but different levels of trust as well. Specifically, lateral trust must exist among peers or equals, vertical trust between a supervisor and subordinates, and external trust between an organization and its clients or customers.

In the context of the Access to Information framework, because of the variety of actors and stakeholders involved, issues of trust must be resolved at multiple levels of interaction. For example, lateral trust is mutually required between Information Co-ordinators, and members of the department in which they carry out their duties, between Investigators from the Office of the Information Commissioner and public service officials, and between the Information Commissioner, Parliament, the courts, and the public service. Vertical trust is mutually required between public servants and the senior and elected officials to whom they are responsible, between senior officials and elected officials, between deputy ministers and their Information Co-ordinators, and between bureaucracy, ministers, and Parliament. Likewise, external trust is mutually required between the public requesting information and those government institutions responding to it. External trust is also required between any third party and any other national government and the governmental institutions to which its information is entrusted.

Absence of trust within these networks of the Access to Information process will produce more formal, adversarial, even dysfunctional and litigious behaviour as the various institutions and individuals seek to protect their particular mandates, roles, and narrow self-interest. Conversely, strong trust relationships on all levels would produce a more informal, collaborative and constructive approach to balancing the right to know with the appropriate measure of confidentiality needed to support effective and efficient government.

Dynamics of Trust

Kramer and Tyler (1996) propose that understanding the dynamics of trust is a key issue, central to its analysis and development. Only by understanding the dynamics of trust can individuals, leaders, and organizations build trust, maintain it, and restore it when it is broken (Peterson, n.d.). And only when the conditions of honesty, openness, integrity, respect, and an ability to deliver on promises will trust be developed effortlessly and reflexively (Ibid.).

Once an atmosphere of trust is established, organizations and its members will be more likely to optimize, compromise, and move quickly to agreement (Ibid.). High levels of trust between and among organizations generally ensure fairer results, reduce the costs of resolving differences, and enhance the durability of any agreement. However, when trust levels are low, or worse, when trust has been broken, or is perceived to have been broken, negotiations invariably degenerate and sub-optimal results ensue (Ibid.). Those who perceive an environment as untrustworthy will act defensively to protect themselves from harm (Carnevale, 1995).

Organizations suffering a low trust environment are typically characterized by conditions of high stress where all members spend a great deal of time and effort looking over their shoulders, justifying past decisions, and seeking out scapegoats when something goes wrong. Individuals in low-trust organizations are pushed to operate with incomplete information and their suggestions are often treated with suspicion. Fear of reprisal or ridicule inhibits them from contemplating new approaches to problem solving and to performing their assigned tasks. In short, a low trust environment weakens decision-making, suppresses innovation, impairs the ability of employees and management alike to focus on the work they ought to be doing, and is unarguably counterproductive (Sonnenburg, 1994).

Organizational structure and processes affect the nature of trust and whether it is promoted or constrained. Bureaucracy, for example, by virtue of its closed-mindedness to criticisms, and form-oriented and narrow-minded procedures, is explicitly unfriendly to the idea of trust (Carnevale, 1995). Organizations that rely excessively on outdated bureaucratic arrangements, risk trapping and suffocating people, encourage defensive behaviour, subvert achievement, interfere with learning, and undermine trust. Where hierarchy, rigid order and controls prevail, trust may take a long time to take hold. Antithetically, in more flexible, flatly structured organizations the development of trust is swift (Kramer and Tyler, 1996). More horizontal organizational forms typically presuppose trust without having any of the traditional sources of trust (Ibid.). Kramer warns, nevertheless, that the trust extant there still may involve some "hedging" to reduce the risk of betrayal.

Management philosophies, i.e., managers' beliefs also affect trust within and among organizations, attitudes and actions all have an impact on trust. In the context of the Access to Information Act these managerial philosophies may be related to the philosophies held by ministers and public service officials serving in leadership or managerial capacities. The choice of reward systems, the opportunity for and the ease of information exchange within and among organizations, units or levels, and the establishment and reinforcement of differences between these levels will foster or impede trust. Likewise, trust is nurtured or destroyed by assumptions that managers hold about those with whom they interact (e.g., assumptions relating to reliability and capabilities) and is embedded in the work processes and governance systems institutionalized in response to those assumptions (Carnavale, 1995). Managers who are driven by personal power motives (McClelland, 1975), are very big on control, use influence methods to make situations more favourable for themselves (even if it comes at the expense of other people and the long-term interests of their organizations), express power in self-aggrandizing ways, manipulate people, overvalue personal loyalty, and exhibit impulsive aggressiveness (Carnevale, 1995), which can destroy trust.

Managerial philosophies may be adjusted to foster trust by focussing organizational expectations, and positively influencing the nature of interactions, the possibility of reciprocity, the embodiment of norms, and the institutionalized determinations about abilities and values (Creed and Miles, 1996). These philosophies must be subject to cognitive biases (Good, 1988) and should reflect the ideological climate of the times (Bendix, 1956; Miles and Creed, 1995). They must evolve over time as a response to ideological forces (managers' needs to rationalize their authority and its uses), operational forces (the demands placed on managerial behaviour by the adoption of new strategies and organizational forms), and socio-cultural forces (the pressure placed on managers by broader societal movements and reforms). Moreover, they must flow from basic assumptions about organizational members, i.e., their reliability, capabilities, and potential for self-direction and self-control (Kramer and Tyler, 1996).

Some suggest that trust (of any kind) is not needed in some organizational activities such as resource management; others believe that trust can entirely substitute for hierarchical control mechanisms. A balanced perspective considers trust and control mechanisms as complementary processes in the development of innovation and efficiency in organizations, and not mutually exclusive (Warah, 2001). For example, trust acts as a facilitating condition between control mechanisms and actual control. In other words, when trust is present, control mechanisms work and actual control is achieved, because people and organizations are more motivated to live by the commonly agreed upon "contract" and even to go beyond it (Ibid.). On their own, formal contracts do not optimize results in organizations. They may produce compliance but not commitment (Das and Teng, 1998). When the interests of parties coincide, there is greater potential for trust to be established and maintained compared to situations where interests diverge. As a governor of short-term actions, the pseudo-trust of aligned self-interests may present a certain temporary utility, but as a basis for long-term and interdependent gain, it has little to offer (Peterson, n.d.).

Both the amount and quality of trust within and among organizations depend on the extent to which members have confidence and believe that their managers and leaders make informed decisions, give honest accounts of events, act in the best interest of the common good, and ensure that statements and actions are consistent. Once trust within and among organizations is achieved, it becomes something that all parties are motivated to develop and maintain (Kramer and Tyler, 1996).

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